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Comments
YOUR PARTNER'S KEEPER: THE DUTY
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
UNDER THE REVISED UNIFORM

PARTNERSHIP ACT
Elisa Feldman
"'Where is your brother Abel?' 'I do not know,' he replied.
'Am I my brother's keeper?'"1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................... 1932
II. THE ADOPTION OF A CONTRACTARIAN RATHER
THAN A FIDUCIARY VIEW OF PARTNERSHIP ...... 1932
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER SECTION 21 OF THE
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT ......................... 1933
A.

PARTNERS OWE EACH OTHER THE DUTY OF FULL
D ISCLOSURE ...........................................

1935
IV. THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
("RUPA"): A PRODUCT OF THE CHANGING LEGAL
ENVIRONM ENT ......................................... 1935
V. THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT REFLECTS AN
AGGREGATE THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP ........... 1936
VI. RUPA REFLECTS A MOVE TOWARDS AN ENTITY
THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP ............................ 1936
A.

"THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR
D EALING" ..............................................

VII. THE NCCUSL RESPONDS TO COMMENTS ON THE
RU PA .....................................................
VIII. THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH IN THE
CONTEXT OF THE UCC ................................
IX. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN THE
PARTNERSHIP CONTEXT AS INTERPRETED BY
THE COURTS ............................................
X. CONCLUSION ............................................
1. Genesis 4:9-10 (The Jerusalem Bible).

1931

1940

1949
1949
1952
1958

1932

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

I. INTRODUCTION
HE Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA") has remained unchanged
since its inception in 1914. Significant changes in entire areas of
law which have occurred since the UPA's enactment have forced a
reconsideration of the long standing statute.2 Important changes in the
federal income tax code, federal securities law, federal bankruptcy code
and the nationwide adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC")
have made it necessary to harmonize partnership law with new develop3
ments in other areas.
Additionally, changes in the political atmosphere have added a new
perspective to the way partnership law is viewed. These changes reflect
an evolving world view that previously embraced a fiduciary perspective
of partnership law. The general belief was that each of the participants in
a partnership owes a special duty to the others due to the partnership
relationship. The emerging view in the Revised Uniform Partnership Act
("RUPA) ' '4 reflects a marked departure from the philosophy of the UPA
in that the RUPA embraces a contractarian outlook that defines the core
of the relationship between the partners according to the contract. Further, the duties each partner owes to the others arises only from the terms
of that particular contractual arrangement.
This comment addresses the recent attempt to revise the Uniform Partnership Act. More specifically, this comment will focus on the new provision of "good faith and fair dealing" recently adopted by the drafters of
the RUPA. In addition, this comment provides an overview of the nature
of fiduciary duties in partnership law as they existed under the UPA, explores the intentions of the RUPA's drafters for creating the changes to
this relatively static and coherent body of law and examines some of the
controversy surrounding the revisions. Finally, this comment will try to
predict the ultimate impact the new provisions will have on partnership
law.
II. THE ADOPTION OF A CONTRACTARIAN RATHER THAN
A FIDUCIARY VIEW OF PARTNERSHIP
Much of the current debate surrounding the revision of the Uniform
Partnership Act has centered around the question of whether to adopt a
2. Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct Midstream: Major Policy
Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 825, 825 (1990). Professor Weidner, the Reporter for the
Revised Uniform Partnership Act, wrote three articles in which he sets forth his purpose
and vision for the Revised Uniform Partnership Act. These articles reflect a moderate
approach toward the revision of the Partnership Act. Weidner speaks of moving away
from a "parentalistic" approach to partnership law; however, he regards the obligation of
"good faith and fair dealing" as a strict provision of the new statute which will serve as an

effective policing mechanism of all partnership arrangements.
3. Id. at 825.
4. See R.U.P.A. § 404 (1994).
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contractarian or fiduciary view of partnership. 5 Under the fiduciary view,
partners may advance their own self-interest through the partnership only
if the other partners understand that the interests of the partnership may
be subordinated and the other partners give their informed consent. This
weltanschauung ("ideal") is the basis for the Uniform Partnership Act
and the common law of partnerships. 6 Under a contractarian view, partners may always advance their own self-interest without notice or consent
of the other partners, unless there is an express agreement to the contrary. Under the contractarian view, the partnership is simply "a bundle
of mutable contractual rights and obligations."'7 By adopting the contractarian perspective, the RUPA heralds the beginning of a fundamental
change in the way that partnership law formerly existed in the common
8
law and in the UPA.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES UNDER SECTION 21 OF THE
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT
Section 21 of the UPA states:
PartnerAccountable as a Fiduciary
(1) Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit,
and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any transaction connected with the
formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use
by him of its property. 9

Partners are fiduciaries among themselves and may delegate the power
to manage the partnership to a few partners or even to one. Because of
this delegation of authority, it is necessary to have a rule that defines the
discretion granted to the partner acting as the managing partner so that
the fiduciary may effectively exercise power on behalf of the other partners.10 The goal of section 21 is to prevent the abuse of fiduciary powers
while still allowing sufficient flexibility. The fiduciary should have adequate discretion to operate in a way that will allow the beneficiary to reap
the full benefit of the fiduciary's activities. 1
5. Allan W. Vestal, Fundamental ContractarianErrorin the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1992, 73 B.U. L. REv. 523, 523 (1993). Professor Vestal is one of a large
number of commentators who believe that the changes to the Uniform Partnership Act
will be detrimental to the future development of partnership law. In particular, Professor
Vestal complains that the conversion from a fiduciary to a contractarian approach in partnership law will operate in a manner that is contrary to the best interest of society. Since
the law ought to be aspirational in nature, any move away from high standards towards a
more cynical view of human nature and human relationships is by definition a step in the
wrong direction. Id
6. Id at 524.
7. Id.
8. Id
9. U.P.A. § 21 (1914).
10. 2 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON
PARTNERSHIP § 6.07, at 6:67-.94 (1994).
11. Id.
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The primary elements of a partner's fiduciary duties, as set forth in

Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross,12 are "utmost good faith, fairness, [and]
loyalty."'1 3 Partners owe each other fiduciary duty unless the fiduciary
duties are waived or altered by the partnership agreement. The fiduciary
duties which developed in the common law and were codified in section

21 of the UPA, are general terms supplied by law to fill the gaps in the

partners' agreement. 14 Partners are free to alter the standard form of
15
fiduciary duties by agreement.
In Latta v. Kilbourn' 6 the Supreme Court stated the general principles

governing the fiduciary duties of partners:
[o]ne partner cannot, directly or indirectly, use partnership assets for
his own benefit; that he cannot, in conducting the business of a partnership, take any profit clandestinely for himself; that he cannot
carry on the business of the partnership for his private advantage;
that he cannot carry on another business in competition or rivalry
with that of the firm, thereby depriving it of the benefit of his time,
skill, and fidelity, without being accountable to his copartners for any
profit that may accrue to him therefrom; that he cannot be permitted

to secure for himself that which it is his duty to obtain, if at all, for
the firm of which he is a member; nor can he avail himself of knowledge or information which may be properly regarded as the property
of the partnership, in the sense that it is available or useful to the
firm for any purpose within the scope of the partnership business. 17
The drafters of the RUPA have potentially altered the nature of the
relationship between partners. Under the UPA, partners were bound to
each other by "the duty of the finest loyalty.' 8 Now the duty partners

owe each other is not as clearly defined. Potentially, the relationship may
not change because the courts may decline the invitation to alter the existing rules governing the nature of the relationship between partners.

The possibility exists, however, that the changes in the RUPA may herald
12. 563 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
13. Id. at 1078 (citation omitted). Further, "the principle of utmost good faith covers
not only dealings and transactions occurring during the partnership but also those taking
place during the negotiations leading to the formation of the partnership." Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (Md. 1972) (citing Allen v. Steinberg, 223 A.2d 240, 246 (Md.
1966)). See also MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 9-404 (1994):
Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as
trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property.
The expression "good faith" has a "well-defined and generally understood meaning, being ordinarily used to describe that state of mind denoting honesty of purpose, freedom
from intention to defraud, and, generally speaking, means being faithful to one's duty or
obligation." Efron v. Kalmanovitz, 57 Cal. Rptr. 248,251 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (citing
People v. Nunn, 296 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 883; People v. Bowman, 320 P.2d 70, 76 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)).
14. See BROMBERG & RIBSrEIN, supra note 10, § 6.07.
15. Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
16. 150 U.S. 524 (1893).
17. Id. at 541.
18. Vestal, supra note 5, at 527-28 n.15 (quoting Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (N.Y. 1928)).
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a veritable revolution in the nature of the partnership relationship and
convert partners from allies to antagonists. 19
A.

PARTNERS OWE EACH OTHER THE DUTY OF FULL DISCLOSURE

A partner who engages in self-dealing but discloses the self-dealing to
the other partners, who do not object, is generally regarded as having
obtained sufficient consent under section 21(1). Consent to the waiver of
fiduciary duties must be made with full disclosure. 20 In some jurisdictions, disclosure alone may not be sufficient without demonstrating the
existence of circumstances which indicate that informed consent was ob21
tained prior to undertaking the self-dealing action.
Under the UPA, the fiduciary relationship of the partners was derived
from the status of the parties rather than defined by contract. "Simply by
virtue of being partners, the participants owed each other certain general
obligations of conduct: 'The duty of each partner to exercise toward the
others the highest integrity and good faith is the very basis of their mutual
rights in all partnership matters.' "22
By agreeing to join the partnership, under the fiduciary view, the individual partners are bound by a
general obligation to advance the collective interest of the partnership
rather than their own individual interests. By acting collectively rather
than individually, the partners hope to achieve a greater return on
capital. 23
IV. THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT ("RUPA"):
A PRODUCT OF THE CHANGING
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT
In August 1992, the Uniform Partnership Act was revised for the first
time since 1914. The revisions were approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL"). Rather
than applause, the new partnership statute immediately became the target of an enormous amount of criticism. Among the most controversial
provisions of the RUPA is section 404, which affirmatively states that
'24
partners have an unwaivable obligation of "good faith and fair dealing.
When the NCCUSL sought the American Bar Association's ("ABA")
endorsement of the RUPA in its current form, the NCCUSL was sorely
disappointed because the ABA refused to endorse the RUPA. The ABA
believed that the RUPA created too many uncertainties that will ultimately give rise to substantial litigation in an effort to clarify the RUPA's
19. Id. at 535.
20. See Jennison v. Bierer, 601 F. Supp. 1167 (D. Vt. 1984).
21. See Russell v. Truitt, 554 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1977, writ ref'd
n.r.e).
22. Vestal, supra note 5, at 526 (quoting EUGENE A. GILMORE, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIPS, INCLUDING LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS

375 (1911)).

23. Id.
24. Barbara Franklin, Updating Partnerships:Efforts to Modernize Uniform Law Stir
Debate, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1993, at 5; R.U.P.A. § 404 (1992).
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ambiguous provisions. 25 The ABA directed the committee to act quickly
to revise the perceived flaws in the RUPA. The prompt revisions are necessary because the RUPA has already been partially adopted in Montana,
Wyoming and Texas. Further, other states are considering adopting the
26
RUPA in the near future.
V.

THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT REFLECTS AN
AGGREGATE THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP

Dean Lewis, the Reporter for the UPA, rejected the entity theory of
partnership law at the turn of the century partly because "those with the
largest practical experience present were opposed to regarding the partnership as a 'legal person' because of the effect of the theory in lessening
the partner's sense of moral responsibility for partnership acts.",27 Under
an aggregate theory of partnership, the partnership itself does not have a
separate legal identity. The partnership is nothing more than a conduit
for the collection of the individuals that it encompasses. Each partner is
regarded as directly owning a portion of the partnerships assets and as
though each partner is conducting a pro-rata share of the partnership
28
business.
VI. THE RUPA REFLECTS A MOVE TOWARDS AN ENTITY
THEORY OF PARTNERSHIP
For both state law and tax reasons, the changes in partnership law
move away from an aggregate theory and closer to an entity theory of
partnership. Under an entity theory, the partnership is treated as a "distinct, almost tangible, entity interposed between partners and partnership
assets. ' 29 Further, the partners' interest is treated "as a separate bundle
of rights and liabilities associated with his participation in the organization, analogous to the interest of a corporate stockholder in his shares of
stock."' 30 Acceptance of the entity approach was resisted due to the nineteenth-century common law preconceptions that a separate legal personality relieved the partners from the threat of personal liability and that
organizational personality was a special privilege to be dispensed only by
31
the legislature.
Partnerships are often perceived by business people more as business
entities than aggregations of individuals. 32 Yet accommodating business
25. Franklin, supra note 24, at 5.
26. Id at 6.
27. Donald J. Weidner, Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAW. 427, 434-35 (1991) (quoting Dean William D. Lewis, The Uniform
PartnershipAct - A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L. REV. 158, 173 (1915)).
28. Donald J. Weidner, A Perspectiveto ReconsiderPartnershipLaw, 16 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 1, 4 (1988).
29. Id
30. Id at 4-5.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id.at 829.
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reality by moving closer to an entity theory arguably means the narrowing of fiduciary duties that was feared by Dean Lewis at the inception of
the UPA. 33 Under the UPA, fiduciary duties govern partnerships "in the
absence of a contrary agreement." 34 Fiduciary duties are general terms
that are supplied by law to fill the gaps in a partnership agreement. 35 The
standard form of fiduciary duties imposed by the UPA can be altered by
36
agreement of the individual parties.
In Meinhard v. Salmon 37 Justice Cardozo eloquently defined the fiduciary duty of a partner as that of a trustee "held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. '38 In Sorenson v. Nielsen39 the court stated that, "[t]he principle that the partnership relation is one of trust and confidence is so firmly established it is
needless to cite authority." ° The Supreme Court of Oregon in Fouchek
v. Janicek4' held partners to an "uncompromising rigidity" of standards
for a trustee. 42 In 1957 in Libby v. L.J. Corp.43 the court recognized:
The relationship of joint adventurers gives rise to certain reasonably
well-defined fiduciary duties and obligations. The duty imposed is
essentially one of good faith, fair and open dealing and the utmost of
candor and disclosure to all concerned. 'The relationship imposes
upon the parties an obligation of loyalty to the joint enterprise and
utmost good faith, fairness and honesty in their dealings with each
other with respect to the subject matter.' 44
Although the standards partners were held to under the UPA and the
developing case law was strict, the strict fiduciary duties could be waived
by the agreement of the parties. Later commentators charged that the
strict fiduciary duties that developed during the reign of the UPA were
not derived from the statute itself. The ABA subcommittee charged with
33. Weidner, supra note 27, at 434-35.
34. BROMBERO & RmsTEIN, supra note 10, § 6.07(a), at 6:68.
35. Id. § 6.07(a), at 6.68-.69.
36. Id. § 6.07(a), at 6:73. See also Singer v. Singer, 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981)
(allowing free competition among partners). But see Jennison v. Bierer, 601 F. Supp. 1167
(D. Vt. 1984) (holding that a partner may not change third-party contracts unilaterally).
37. 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
38. Id. at 546.
39. 240 N.Y.S. 250 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1930).
40. Id. at 253.
41. 225 P.2d 783 (Or. 1950).
42. Id. at 789.
The partnership relationship is of a fiduciary character which carries with it
the requirement of utmost good faith and loyalty and the obligation of each
member of the partnership to make full disclosure of all known information
that is significant and material to the affairs or property of the partnership.
Herring v,Offutt, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (Md. 1972) (citing Allen v. Steinberg, 223 A.2d 240
(Md. 1966); Hambleton v. Rhind, 36 A. 597 (Md. 1897)).
The duty of loyalty resulting from the fiduciary position of a partner is so uncompromising that "the severity of a partner's breach will not be questioned. The question is only
whether there has been any breach at all." Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d
233, 238 (Wash. 1974) (en banc) (citing Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928)).
43. 247 F.2d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

44. Id. at 81 (citation omitted).
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the task of revising the UPA believes section 21 of the UPA has been
viewed as the foundation for "broad fiduciary dut[ies]" 45 when in fact
section 21 could be read "merely as an anti-theft provision." The committee recommended a revision of the section "to incorporate the full
range of fiduciary duties developed by the cases (due care, good faith,
loyalty, and full disclosure of all material facts)." 47 In an attempt to accomplish their stated goals, the NCCUSL incorporated into the RUPA a
mandatory obligation of "good faith and fair dealing." 48 The mandatory
duties introduced by the RUPA alters a body of law that developed over
decades under the UPA. Under the UPA the only section that imposed
substantive fiduciary duties was UPA section 21, which provides that a
partner must account only for profits derived "without the consent of the
other partners. '49 Under section 21 of the UPA the courts permitted individuals to form partnership agreements that allowed partners to compete with the partnership and to engage in self-dealing. 50 Partners under
the UPA could enter partnership agreements permitting copartners to
pursue outside opportunities to avoid the greater expense of compensating partners to forego these opportunities and the cost of litigating partnership opportunity questions. "Under the UPA section 21, such
agreements are clearly permissible."' l Under the "good faith and fair
dealing" provisions of the RUPA, agreements such as these will create
litigation over whether "these agreements breach a fundamental 'good
'52
faith' duty."
According to one commentator, the RUPA "turns the world upside
down with respect to the fiduciary relations of partners inter se."'53 The
source of this change is the replacement of the fiduciary nature of partnership law with a contractarian view, altering the place of self-interest in
partnership law. The comments to the RUPA state, "[a] partner does not
violate a duty or obligation under this [Revised Act] or under the partnership agreement merely because the partner's conduct furthers the
'54
partner's own interest.
45. U.P.A. Revision Subcommittee of the Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations, Should the Uniform PartnershipAct Be Revised?, 43 Bus.
LAW. 121, 151 (1987).
46. Id.
47. Id. See also Klein v. Weiss, 395 A.2d 126 (Md. 1978) (applying fiduciary duties to
limited partnerships); Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1074 (2d Cir. 1977)
(finding a violation of limited partners' rights in a securities action). But see Roper v.
Thomas, 298 S.E.2d 424, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that limited partners have
limited duties in partnership agreements).
48. Larry E. Ribstein, A Mid-Term Assessment of the Project to Revise the Uniform
PartnershipAct, 46 Bus. LAW. 111, 137 (1990).
49. ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, SPECIAL RELEASE ON THE REVISED
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP 59 (1993) (quoting U.P.A. § 21).
50. Id.
51. Ribstein, supra note 48, at 138.
52. Id. at 139.
53. Vestal, supra note 5, at 535.
54. Id. at 535 (quoting R.U.P.A. § 404(f) (1992)).
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The contractarian point of view is also a product of the common law.
The court in Exxon Corp. v. Burglin5 5 cited Bromberg & Ribstein on Partnership for the proposition that a "[p]artner['s] fiduciary duties are aspects of the 'standard form' of partnership. As with respect to the other
rights and duties among the partners, the partners may alter the standard
form fiduciary duties to suit their particular relationship. '5 6 For this reason, courts should refrain from interfering with the bargained for terms of
the partnership agreement.5 7 Further, in Exxon, it is apparent that partners are not being held to the "punctilio of honor" 58 that Justice Cardozo
held out as the appropriate standard. In Exxon the court upheld a bargained for agreement by sophisticated parties that granted "the limited
partners the right to 'engage in or own an interest in other business ventures engaged in the same or similar business as the Partnership.' -59 The
court reasoned that since this provision of the agreement "abrogates the
fiduciary duty of loyalty by allowing partners to compete with their partnership, it is reasonable to expect some limitation on the fiduciary duty of
disclosure."6o
The ABA Subcommittee approached the duty of good faith and fair
dealing with a contractarian view in that "the duty of good faith and fair
dealing is a concept of general contract law and is not to be confused as
creating a special relationship duty - a fiduciary duty."'6 1 One possible
effect of the contract-based approach is a change in the nature of the
remedy available in the case of a breach. Contract based remedies tend
to be narrower than fiduciary remedies that tend to provide plaintiffs with
greater recourse. 62
The contractarians argue that parties should be allowed to explicitly
make informed changes to the statutory form of fiduciary obligations because in the partnership context the negotiations are usually conducted
fairly by knowledgeable and sophisticated parties with the assistance of
counsel. Under these types of circumstances "mandatory rules are [not]
'63
necessary to protect unwary parties.
55. 4 F.3d 1294 (5th Cir. 1993).
56. Il. at 1298 (quoting BROMBERO & RiBsTmIN, supra note 10, § 6.07(h), at 6:89
(1991); id. § 6.06, at 6:67 (arguing that "parties could at least circumscribe the right to
information"); id. § 6.05(d), at 6:59 (partners can bargain over access to information)).
57. Exxon, 4 F.3d at 1298; Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 657 P.2d 831, 835
(Alaska 1982).
58. Meinhard, 164 N.E. at 546.
59. Exxon, 4 F.3d at 1299 (quoting § 4.03 of the parties' Partnership Agreement).
60. Id.
61. Vestal, supra note 5, at 543 (quoting Letter from Gerald V. Niesar, Chair, Subcommittee on the Proposed Revised Uniform Partnership Act of the ABA Committee on Partnerships and Incorporated Business Organizations, to Lane Kneedler, Chair, Drafting
Committee to Revise the Uniform Partnership Act, NCCUSL 3 (Mar. 17, 1992) (on file
with the Boston University Law Review)).
62. Vestal, supra note 5, at 544-45.
63. Id. at 561 (quoting Ribstein, supra note 48, at 138); see also, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr.,
JudicialReview of FiduciaryDecisionmaking - Some Theoretical Perspectives, 80 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1, 21 (1985).
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"THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING" 64

Under the most recent version of the RUPA, the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing is set out in section 404(e): "A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other partners under this
[Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. '65 Section
103(b)(5) of the RUPA states, "A partnership agreement may not: eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under section 404(e);"
but the partnership agreement may determine the standards by which
the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards are
not manifestly unreasonable. 66 The implication of these provisions is not
yet completely clear because the concept of a mandatory obligation that
may not be waived by agreement of the parties has not been previously
tested in partnership law.
Since the "obligation of good faith and fair dealing" is new to the Act,
there is substantial debate as to how the new statutory obligation will
impact partnership law. Some commentators believe that the obligation
simply codifies existing case law. For example, in a 1977 case, the Court
of Appeals of New York in Gelder Medical Group v. Webber 67 treated the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing as a settled area of the law. A
partner in a medical group was forced out of the partnership in accordance with the partnership agreement and later engaged in his own medical practice in violation of a noncompete agreement. The expelled doctor
contended that he was entitled to practice medicine in violation of the
partnership agreement because he was expelled in "bad faith," rendering
the original agreement void. The court recognized that "in the timehonored language of the law, there is an implied term of good faith. '' 6
Because the doctor in question failed to demonstrate bad faith on the
part of his former partners, he failed to properly raise the issue of good
69
faith in this case.
70
In a 1982 case from the Supreme Court of Kentucky, Marsh v. Gentry
the obligation of good faith was litigated in the partnership context.
Marsh involved a partnership that owned race horses. The partnership
consigned one of the horses for sale and, without the knowledge of
Marsh, Gentry secretly bought the race horse. Marsh repeatedly questioned Gentry on the identity of the new owner, but never received an
honest answer. Gentry told Marsh that the horse had been sold to someone in California and refused to provide the name of the owner. Marsh
"

64. R.U.P.A. § 404 (1992).
65. Id. § 404(e) (1992).
66. R.U.P.A. § 103(b)(5) (1992).
67. 363 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977).
68. Id. at 577 (citing Van Valkenburgh, Nooger & Neville, Inc. v. Hayden Publishing
Co., 281 N.E.2d 142, 144-45 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972); 10 N.Y. JUR. 2d
Contracts § 203 (1982)).
69. Webber, 363 N.E.2d at 577.
70. 642 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1982).
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learned that Gentry owned the horse eleven months later when the horse
won the Kentucky Derby. 71
In Kentucky, the statute governing the conduct of partners in this circumstance is section 362.250(1) (1954).72 The statute provides that:

Every partner must account to the partnership for any benefit and
hold as trustee for it any profit derived by him without the consent of
the other partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or73liquidation of the partnership or from any use by
him of its profit.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky held that by both misleading and
74
withholding information from his partner, Gentry violated the statute.
Under the UPA, even prior to its revision, partners are required "to
maintain a higher degree of good faith due to the partnership agreement.
The requirement of full disclosure among partners as to partnership business cannot be escaped. ' 75 Prior to the RUPA the Supreme Court of
Kentucky interpreted the obligation of good faith as it applies to partnership law to mean that partners may not withhold information or mislead
partners because good faith requires full disclosure. The court added that
if Gentry had fully disclosed to Marsh his intentions to buy the horse
prior to7 6 the purchase, Marsh would not have had a claim against
Gentry.

Similarly, in Wyler v. Feuer77 the California Court of Appeals found
that in a limited partnership the general partner owes a duty of good faith
and fair dealing to the other partners. 78 Under the duty of good faith, the
general partner may not be held liable for honest mistakes made in the
exercise of business judgment. 79 Further, general partners cannot be held
liable "for losses incurred in the good faith performance of their duties
when they have used such care as an ordinarily prudent person would
use."80 In addition, the good faith of the business judgment and management of the general partner will not be measured in hindsight, 81 but
rather from the point of view of the general partner at the time she made
the decision.
More recently, in Schluter v. United FarnersElevator8 2 the UCC obli-

gation of good faith and fair dealing under Minnesota law was held to be
71. 1d at 575.
72. Ky. REv. STAT.

ANN. § 362.250(1) (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1954).
73. 642 S.W.2d at 575 (quoting § 362.250(1)).
74. Id. at 575-76.
75. Marsh v. Gentry, 642 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Ky. 1982) (citing Van Hooser v. Keenon,
271 S.W.2d 270 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954); Smith v. Gibson, 220 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949)).
76. Id
77. 149 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
78. Id. at 632 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 15021 (West 1991); Laux v. Freed, 348 P.2d
873 (Cal. 1960) (en banc); Dennis v. Gordon, 125 P. 1063 (Cal. 1912)).
79. Id. at 632-33 (citing Findley v. Garrett, 240 P.2d 421 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Marsili v.
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 124 Cal. Rptr. 313 (Cal Ct. App. 1975)).
80. Wyler, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 633 (citing CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a)).

81. Id

82. 479 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
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a subjective test, meaning that good faith requires "honesty of intent

rather than of diligence or negligence. '8 3 Another way of phrasing the
subjective good faith test is the "white heart, empty head" test, meaning
that "subjective good faith is simply 'the honest belief that [your] conduct
is rightful.' "84
The Reporter of the RUPA, Donald Weidner, expresses concern that
"the only mandatory fiduciary duty in RUPA is taken from the contract
law governing relations not generally seen as involving mutual confi-

dence. One wonders whether there should be a higher floor for a rela-

tionship widely considered as far more intimate."8 5 Weidner continues to
note that although good faith might be regarded as fairly weaker in the
UCC context "there is authority that suggests that the duty of good faith

86
will be given a much more powerful reading in the partnership context."

Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.8 7 is typical of courts'

holdings on the obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the UCC context. In this case, the Second Circuit held that under Connecticut law,
parties may rely on the express terms of the contract and that the implied
obligation of good faith may not replace any express contractual terms.as
Similarly, in L.C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.8 9 the court found that

in the context of the UCC, "[t]he purpose of the good faith obligation is
to determine the terms to be implied in the contract when the terms are
not expressly provided." 90
In La Sara Grain Co. v. FirstNational Bank of Mercedes9' the Supreme

Court of Texas held that in the context of the UCC, the "obligation of
good faith is imposed on the performance of every contract or duty
within the Code." 92 Further, the court found that good faith is measured
'93
by a subjective test: "the actual belief of the party in question.
Whether the actual belief of the party is reasonable is not relevant to the
94
test of good faith.
The Official Comment to the RUPA section 103 explains that
83. Id. at 85 (citing Eldon's Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 207 N.W.2d 282,
287 (Minn. 1973)).
84. Schluter, 479 N.W.2d at 85 (citing Wohlrabe v. Pownell, 307 N.W.2d 478, 483
(Minn. 1981)).
85. Weidner, supra note 27, at 460-61.
86. Id at 461 (citing Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (en banc); Levy v.
Disharoon, 749 P.2d 84, 89 (N.M. 1988); Donahue 328 N.E.2d at 505).
87. 771 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1985).
88. Id. at 679 (citing Thangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 740 (9th
Cir. 1985); Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 938
(1979); Zullo v. Smith, 427 A.2d 409, 412 (Conn. 1980)).
89. 625 F. Supp. 477 (M.D.N.C. 1985).
90. Id. at 481 (emphasis omitted) (citing Cardinal Stone, 669 F.2d at 395; Corenswet,
594 F.2d at 129).
91. 673 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1984).
92. Id at 563.
93. Id (citing Riley v. First State Bank, 469 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
94. Id
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The RUPA attempts to provide a standard that partnerships can rely
upon in drafting exculpatory agreements and that courts will respect
in enforcing them. It is not necessary that the agreement be restricted to a particular transaction. This would mean bargaining over
every deal, which is inefficient. The agreement may be drafted in
terms of types or categories of activities or transactions, but it should
be reasonably specific. Context may be significant. Ultimately, the
courts must decide the outer limits of validity of such agreements. It
is intended that the risk of judicial refusal to enforce manifestly unreasonable exculpatory clauses will discourage sharp practices while
legitimate needs of the parties in structuring
accommodating the
95
their relationship.
Commentators have predicted that section 103(b)(5) of the RUPA, allowing partners to determine the standard by which the "performance of
the obligation" of good faith and fair dealing may be measured, can be
established by the partners by selecting a single standard applicable to all
of the dealings and transactions of the partners. The partners could elect
a high standard such as "utmost good faith," or a low standard of "honesty in fact" to govern the agreement. The standard chosen may not be
"manifestly unreasonable" nor can the obligation be waived in its
96
entirety.
Contractarian theorists believe that a partnership is essentially a
"nexus of contracts" 97 because the partners substantially agree to the
terms of the partnership. 98 In general, contractarians argue that a default
system of fiduciary duties is appropriate for a partnership. 99 In Singer v.
Singer'0° the Oklahoma Court of Appeals concluded that if a partnership
agreement contains a provision allowing the partners to compete with
each other, in effect, contracting away a fiduciary relationship between
the partners, the partners are bound by their agreement so long as it was
not entered into under conditions of "fraud, illegality or overreaching."' 0 ' The Singer court even regarded predatory competition between
drafters of the partnership agreement
partners permissible so long as the
02
intended to achieve that result.'
95. R.U.P.A. § 103 cnt. 2 (1992).
96. Claire Moore Dickerson, Is It Appropriate to Appropriate CorporateConcepts: Fi-

duciary Duties and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 111, 141-42
(1993).
97. Id at 112; see also, Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Contract,89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989).
98. Id.
99. Id.

100. 634 P.2d 766 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981).
101. Id. at 772 n.16.
102. Furthermore, as the Supreme Court of Washington explained:
Partners may include in the partnership articles practically any agreement
they wish and if the asserted self-dealing was actually contemplated and specifically authorized with a method for determining, in advance, the amount of
the profit it would not, ipso facto, be impermissible and deemed wrongful.
Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233,236 (Wash. 1974) (en banc) (citing Riviera
Congress Assocs. v. Yassky, 264 N.Y.S.2d 624 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965)).
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Under the new provision of the RUPA creating a mandatory obligation

of good faith and fair dealing, a jurisdiction that adopts the RUPA in its
present form would arguably be unable to render a holding similar to
Singer because freedom of contract will be greatly diminished by the creation of the nonwaivable and undefined provision of good faith and fair

dealing. Confronted with facts similar to the facts in Singer, a court in a
jurisdiction that has adopted the RUPA would be obligated to nullify a
partnership agreement that explicitly allowed predatory competition be-

tween partners because of the omnipresent existence of good faith as the
policing mechanism that will be implied into every agreement regardless
of the express intent of the parties. 10 3 Further, it can be argued that the

obligation of good faith is not a fiduciary duty because an individual can
be subject to the requirements of the UCC good faith without being a
fiduciary. Therefore, the obligation of good faith and fair dealing has the
potential of having a greater reach and scope than the fiduciary duties

that "good faith" is purportedly replacing. Despite the grand expectations of the drafters of RUPA, however, it is likely that courts will follow
the lead of decisions on good faith made in the context of the UCC and
will be reluctant to use the implied obligation of good faith to override

any explicit contractual terms. 1°4 The courts tend to decline invitations to
reanalyze negotiated terms of contracts for evidence of good faith.
wholesale
Therefore it seems unlikely that the courts will engage in the
10 5

revision of bargained for terms in partnership agreements.
Once the question of law as to whether the partnership agreement itself is ambiguous has been settled, however, "it is within the province of
the jury to determine the intention of the parties."' 1 6 The question of
good faith is an issue for the jury to decide.' 0 7 The jury determines

whether an action was undertaken in good faith by "weigh[ing] the credibility of the witnesses, gaug[ing] nuances of voice and expression, and

103. However, although the obligation of good faith may not be disclaimed by the
agreement of the parties, the parties may "determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations are to be measured only 'if such standards are not manifestly
unreasonable.'" Eckstein v. Cummins, 321 N.E.2d 897, 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (citation
omitted).
104. Grand Light & Supply Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 771 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1985); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
938 (1979); see also Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 740 (9th Cir.
1985) (holding that an implied covenant of good faith in every contract is too broad); Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982) (noting that the U.C.C.
implied good faith test is erratic).
105. Id. The law in Connecticut is that the parties to a contract "may rely on the express terms of their contract." Grand Light, 771 F.2d at 679 (citing Zullo v. Smith, 427 A.2d
409, 412 (Conn. 1980)). Further, when a contract is negotiated by experienced business
persons the courts refuse to use the U.C.C. requirement of good faith to override the express terms of a contract. CardinalStone, 669 F.2d at 396.
106. Froemming v. Gate City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 822 F.2d 723, 729 (8th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Stetson v. Investors Oil, Inc., 140 N.W.2d 349, 357 (N.D. 1966)).
107. Froemming, 822 F.2d at 731.
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sift[ing] through competing and conflicting versions of what occurred and
08
what state of mind each actor brought to the occurrence.'
In Bauer v. Blomfield Co./Holden Joint Venture' °9 the Supreme Court
of Alaska was unwilling to find that partners owe a duty of good faith and
fair dealing to assignees of a partner's interest. 1 10 In the dissenting opinion, two justices observed that when the Blonifield Company/Holden
Joint Venture was formed, a contractual relationship was formed among
the partners. Based on the court's previous holdings that an implied covenant of good faith exists in all contracts,"' the dissenters concluded that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is also operative in a partnership
contract." 2 In this context, the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing means that "neither party... [may] do anything which will injure
the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement.""h 3 As the
dissent noted in Bauer, a partnership has the right to decide not to make
distributions, but that decision must be made in good faith, reflecting legitimate business concerns. 114 Since the assignee in Bauer stepped into
the shoes of the partner in accordance with a contract right, the other
partners owe a duty of good faith to the assignee in deciding whether to
make the distribution. The determination of whether the decision was
made in good faith is a question of fact for the jury." 5 In a motion for
summary judgment, the burden should be on the moving party to show
that no issue as to material fact existed as to whether the decision to
make the distribution was made in good faith. Since the court held that
the obligation of good faith does not apply to the facts of this case, the
assignee was effectively left without a remedy to enforce his partnership
profits, rendering the assignment a worthless transaction and culminating
believed was contrary to fundamenin a result which the dissenting judge
116
tal contract and assignment law.
The holding of the Supreme Court of Alaska in Bauer conforms with
the libertarian camp, which resists implying good faith in every partnership agreement and argues for freedom of contract and fiduciary duties
that are waivable by agreement of the parties. The dissent in Bauer
closely reflects the rationale that led to the adoption of the good faith and
108. Id

109. 849 P.2d 1365 (Alaska 1993).
110. Id. at 1367 n.2.
111. Id. at 1368-69 (Mathews, J. & Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting). See also Terry A.
Lambert Plumbing, Inc. v. Western Sec. Bank, 934 F.2d 976, 982-83 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that, under Nebraska law, there exists the implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing in every contract, but that when acting under the express terms of the contract,
there is no breach of the obligation of good faith and fair dealing).
112. Bauer, 849 P.2d at 1369 (Matthews, J. & Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. (quoting Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979)).
114. Id. at 1369; see Brooke v. Mt. Hood Meadows Oreg., Ltd., 725 P.2d 925, 929 (Or.
Ct. App. 1986); see also Betz v. Chena Hot Springs Group, 657 P.2d 831,835 (Alaska 1982)
(holding that a partner may be involuntarily retired if it is in the best interest of the firm).
115. Bauer v. Blomfield CoJHolden Joint Venture, 849 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Alaska 1993)
(Matthews, J. & Rabinowitz, CJ., dissenting).
116. Id. at 1370.
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fair dealing provision of the RUPA. The drafters of the RUPA envisioned a good faith provision that would be implied in every partnership
regardless of the intent of the individual parties, drawing from contract
law and the UCC provision of good faith as merely a starting point for
the partnership context. In fact, the drafters of the RUPA believe the
duty of good faith outlined in the UCC is too narrow for partnership law,
where the nature of the relationship is inherently one of mutual trust and
heightened responsibility towards the partners to the agreement.
The commentators who adhere to a contractarian world view believe
that mandatory fiduciary duties are "bad policy. 11 7 They believe the
existence of fiduciary duties may impede an agent from exercising her
discretion out of fear of breaching her fiduciary duty and potential exposure to subsequent liability. These commentators believe there are better
means available to control partners such as employing incentive compensation. Therefore it may be preferable for a firm to have the ability to
"contract out of fiduciary duties" rather than to impose a parentalistic
standard blanket provision on all partnerships regardless of the surround1
ing circumstances. 8
In the opinion of one commentator, the RUPA will not enforce the
obligation of good faith with the same high level of expectations with
which Cardozo imbued the standard. Instead, the RUPA mandates that
the standard may not fall below a "manifestly unreasonable" standard, a
standard that is arguably higher than the standard of good faith in contract law. 119
By adopting the RUPA, arguably the generally defined expectations
enunciated in Meinhard v. Salmon will be replaced with a "contract-based
regime with more precisely defined obligations.' 2 0 Replacing the historic fiduciary attitude with a rule narrowly defining the partnership relationship will be dangerous because rules tend to invite evasion. 12 1
Although narrowly defined rules may prove to be more efficient from a
business stand point, such rules may prove not to benefit society because
fiduciary law more than contract law tends to induce fiduciaries to work
22
to promote the collective good.
Weidner, the Reporter of the RUPA, notes in his three articles that the
RUPA was drafted with the intention of replacing parentalism with freedom of contract as the overarching principle of the Act. In doing so, the
117. BROMBERO & RIBSTEIN, supra note 49, at 59.

118. Id. See Donald J. Weidner, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct Midstream: Ma-

jor Policy Decisions, 21 U. TOL. L. REv. 825, 856-57 (1990). See generally Henry N. Butler
& Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990) (arguing against mandatory legal rules in the context of

fiduciary duties).
119. Weidner, supra note 2, at 854.

120. Vestal, supra note 5, at 539.
121. I
122. I (citing Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Death of Fiduciary Duty in Close Corporations, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1675, 1695-96 (1990)); Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 911-12
(Or. Ct. App. 1989).
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drafters assumed that, in most cases, partnership agreements are not adhesion contracts involving inequality of bargaining power. Rather, most
each contribpartnerships involve "relative equals" joining together, with 123
uting to the goal of starting a business and making money.
The fact that the obligation of good faith and fair dealing is a
mandatory provision of the RUPA does not seem remarkable on its face.
By their very nature, partnerships entail a great deal of trust. Partnerships involve long-term, complex interpersonal relationships. Therefore,
good faith appears to be the minimum that one should expect from partners. The only flaw in this reasoning is that, because the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing has intentionally been left undefined in the
124
RUPA, it is subject to a wide range of interpretations by the courts.
The fear that the courts will read an extremely high standard into the
obligation of good faith can render parties who litigate partnership agreements susceptible to coerced, excessive settlements. 125 The uncertainty in
the meaning of the standard will inevitably lead to litigation, especially
126
when the stakes are high.
not
The RUPA allows the parties to "identify specific conduct that does
' 27 This
violate the duty if the conduct is not manifestly unreasonable.'
provision permits the partners to define good faith within the context of
their specific partnership agreement as long as the identified conduct is
not manifestly unreasonable. In Eckstein v. Cummins128 the court noted
that under the Uniform Commerical Code the obligation of good faith
"may not be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement
is
determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations1' 29
to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.'
Perhaps the goal of this provision was to create an equilibrium between
freedom of contract and the public policy of not tolerating bad faith
among partners.
In an attempt to provide a lifeline to aid in the interpretation of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing, the Reporter suggested that the
formula for good faith in the UCC offers a fair basis of comparison, yet
the UCC definition of good faith is too narrow for the purposes of partnership law.
The official comments to RUPA state that "[t]he obligation of good
faith and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the partners because of the consensual nature of a partnership.' 130 Comment 4, in a
further attempt to clarify this new provision, states:
123. J. Dennis Hynes, The Revised Uniform PartnershipAct: Some Comments on the
Latest Draft of RUPA, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 727, 754 (1992).
124. Id.at 755-56.
125. Id.at 757.
126. Id.at 756.
127. R.U.P.A. § 404(b) (1992).
128. 321 N.E.2d 897 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
129. Id at 905 n.9 (quoting OHio REv. CODE ANN.§ 1301.02(C) (Anderson 1973)).
130. R.U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 4 (1992).
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The meaning of "good faith and fair dealing" is not firmly fixed
under present law. "Good faith" clearly suggests a subjective element, while "fair dealing" implies an objective component. It was
decided to leave the term undefined in the Act and allow the courts
131
to develop its meaning based on the experience of real cases.
The comment references a law review article which provides the following equitable definition of good faith: "good faith has pervasive and
distinctive relevance. It is natural for two parties to assume that each will
act in good faith toward the other throughout the course of their contractual dealings."' 132
Further, "good faith, as used in the case law, is best understood as an
'excluder' - it is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of its
own, but which serves to exclude many heterogenous forms of bad
faith."'1 33 Prior to the RUPA, the partnership relationship was recognized
as being governed by "utmost good faith."'1 34 Further, the obligation was
recognized of "each member of the partnership to make full disclosure of
significant and material to the affairs or
all known information that is
1 35
property of the partnership."'
The UCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact."'1 3 6 For a merchant,
good faith includes "the observance of reasonable commercial standards
of fair dealing in the trade."'1 37 The comments to the RUPA reject the
UCC definition as overly narrow and suggest that the UCC honesty in
fact is but one aspect of a broader and farther reaching definition of good
faith that will apply to partnerships. The comments explain that "[i]n
some situations the obligation of good faith includes a disclosure component. Depending on the circumstances, a partner may have an affirmative disclosure obligation that supplements the section 403 duty to render
38
information on demand."'
Further, in the RUPA section 103(b)(5) "the obligation of good faith
and fair dealing" becomes a mandatory provision that governs all partnership agreements. Comment 2 to section 103 states that the purported
reason for nonwaivability:
[is to] ensur[e] a fundamental core of fiduciary responsibility.
Neither the fiduciary duties of loyalty or care, not the obligation of
good faith and fair dealing, may be eliminated entirely. However,
the statutory requirements of each can be modified by agreement.
Subsection (b)(3)(i) permits the partners [by agreement] to identify specific types or categories of partnership activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty.., while subsection (b)(5) authorizes the
131. Id.
132. Robert S. Summers, "Gbod Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 197-98 (1968).

133. Id. at 196.
134. Herring v. Offutt, 295 A.2d 876, 879 (Md. 1972).

135. Id. (citing Allen v. Steinberg, 223 A.2d 240 (Md. 1966)).
136. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19) (1992).
137. R.U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 4 (1992); U.C.C. § 2-103(b) (1992).
138. R.U.P.A. § 404 cmt. 4 (1992).
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partners to determine the standards by which the performance of the
obligation of good faith and fair dealing is to be measured. The language of subsection (b)(5) is based on UCC section 1-102(3). Under
those provisions, the partners can negotiate and draft specific contract provisions tailored to their particular needs, but blanket waivers [of duty] are unenforceable.'1 9
In either case, the modifications must not be manifestly unreasonable.
This should tend to "discourage overreaching by a partner with superior
the courts may refuse to enforce an overly broad
bargaining power since
140
exculpatory clause.'
VII.

THE NCCUSL RESPONDS TO COMMENTS ON RUPA

After the drafting committee revised the Uniform Partnership Act,
many groups and individuals issued reports suggesting various changes to
the RUPA. A Working Group ("WG") appointed by the chair of the
drafting committee considered a wide variety of reports and comments.
its
After considering all of the commentary, the WG made a report of 141
recommendations to amend the RUPA to the full Drafting Committee.
The WG considered suggestions revising the RUPA so that all of the
duties of section 404 should be waivable by the partnership agreement.
The WG also heard contrary arguments such that section 404 already
grants excessive freedom of contract. Therefore, the WG chose not to
abandon the careful balance that already exists in the RUPA section
404.142 It was further suggested that the new inclusion of the obligation
of good faith and fair dealing is a bad idea because the courts will inevitably construe the obligation of good faith and fair dealing as a fiduciary
duty despite carefully drafted language to the contrary. Yet, the WG decided to retain the obligation of good faith and fair dealing "[b]ecause the
first sentence of the subsection makes it very clear that good faith and fair
dealing is a dependent obligation and not an independent fiduciary
duty."143
VIII.

THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH IN THE CONTEXT
OF THE UCC

Section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code states that every contract which falls within the ambit of the UCC "imposes an obligation of
good faith in its performance or enforcement.' 44 Once a contract has
139. R.U.P.A. § 103 cmt. 2 (1992).
140. d
141. WORKING GROUP OF THE DRAFTING CoMMrrrEE TO REVISE THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr ivv (1992).
142. WORKING GROUP OF THE DRAFrING COMMITTEE TO REVISE THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Acr NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, RESPONSE TO COMMENTS ON THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT (1992) AND
RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS 16 (1993).
143. ld at 18.
144. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992).
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been formed, a binding obligation of good faith will be implied into every
contract. 145 Section 1-201(19) of the UCC defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concemed."'146 The Official
Comments explain that whenever good faith is mentioned in the UCC, it
means at a minimum "honesty in fact," in addition to the minimal definition of "good faith." Other sections of the UCC supplement the definition with additional specific components. For example, in section 2103(1)(b) good faith is defined for a merchant to include the "observance
of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."'1 47 The
Official Comments to section 1-203 state that the "section sets forth a
basic principle running throughout this Act. The principle involved is
that in commercial transactions good faith is required in the performance
and enforcement of all agreements or duties." 48 The Official Comment
further states that the concept of "good faith" is a broad duty that applies
49
to every contract or duty within the ambit of the UCC.'
A demonstration of a narrow view of good faith in the UCC context
can be seen in L.C. Williams Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp.150 where the court
held that good faith under the UCC was simply a filler term-a method
of determining the implied terms when terms were not expressly provided in the contract. 151 Once again, the courts made it clear that the
purpose of good faith, in context of the UCC, is not to override the express terms of the contract or to alter the terms in a manner inconsistent
with the intent of the parties. The purpose of the concept of the obligation of good faith, however, is "to determine the terms to be implied in
1 52
the contract when the terms are not expressly provided."'
Robert Summers, in his article on the subject of good faith, explains
that good faith in the context of the UCC, is not limited to the requirement of honesty. Good faith includes honesty but it is a broader concept
that "is not to be measured by a man's own standard of right, but by that
which it has adopted and prescribed as a standard for the observance of
all men in their dealings with each other.' 5 3 In fact, good faith is such a
broad concept that a judge may rely on it as an independent doctrine or
as a theory of liability for misconduct which is not fraudulent or negligent.' 54 Similarly, Timothy Muris has defined good faith in the context of
145. CHARLES L. KNAPP &
75 (1987).
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146. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1992).
147. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b) (1992).

148. U.C.C. § 1-203 at cmt. (1992).
149. Id.
150. 625 F. Supp. at 477.
151. Id.; Cardinal Stone Co. v. Rival Mfg. Co., 669 F.2d 395, 396 (6th Cir. 1982); Corenswet, Inc. v. Amana Refrigeration, Inc., 594 F.2d 129, 138 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S.

938 (1979).

152. Williams Oil, 625 F. Supp. at 481 (citing Cardinal Stone, 669 F.2d at 395; Corenswet, 594 F.2d at 129).
153. Summers, supra note 132, at 204 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. F.C. Trebein Co., 52
N.E. 834, 837 (Ohio 1898)).
154. See Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W. 2d 267 (Wis. 1965).
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the UCC as a means of preventing "opportunistic behavior."'1 55 The obligation of good faith in general, can be described as an "excluder" of behavior by a party to a contract that would undermine the spirit of the
contract even though the conduct was not expressly forbidden by the con56
tract itself.'
In Kirke La Shelle Co. v. PaulArmstrong Co.'5 7 the New York Court of
Appeals stated:
[I]n every contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring
the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract, which
means that in every contract8 there exists an implied covenant of
5
good faith and fair dealing.'
Under this "fruits of the contract" approach, Steven Burton describes
bad faith as an attempt by a party to recapture "forgone opportunities."'15 9 Burton describes "forgone opportunities" as possibilities that
present themselves during the course of dealings between the parties to
realize a gain that the party should have recognized as proscribed by the
relevant contract.' °
In First Texas Savings Ass'n v. Comprop Investment Properties6 1 the
court found that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing was implied in
every contract.' 62 To determine the nature of the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the courts measure the "justifiable expectations of the
parties. As a result, where one party acts arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably, that conduct exceeds the justifiable expectations of the second party and consequently, the second party should be compensated for
its damages and/or excused from performance.' 63 In essence, good faith
is a question of fact in which the determination depends upon "the parties' standing, events which occur during the contractual relationship between the parties, and the degree of performance tendered by the parties
to the agreements as a condition precedent to any subsequent modifications or waivers." 164
155. Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L.
REV. 521 (1981).
156. See KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 145, at 377; Summers, supra note 132, at 196.
157. 188 N.E. 163 (1933).
158. Id. at 167.
159. Steven Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in
Good Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369, 387 (1980); see Steven Burton, Good Faith Performance
of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1981);
Steven Burton, More on Good Faith Performance ofa Contract: A Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497, 500 (1984); KNAPP & CRYSTAL, supra note 145, at 376.
160. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith,
supra note 159, at 369.
161. 752 F. Supp. 1568 (M.D. Fla. 1990).
162. Id. at 1573; See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF THE LAW OF CorrAcrs § 205
(1981); U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203, 2-103(1) (1992); Department of Ins. v. Teachers Ins.
Co., 404 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1981); City of San Antonio & City Water Bd. v. Forgy, 769 S.W.2d
293 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
163. First Texas Savings, 752 F. Supp. at 1574.
164. ld at 1572.
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In Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc., Duncombe v. State Bank 165 the
Supreme Court of Iowa interpreted good faith in the context of the UCC
very restrictively. The court would not permit the provision of good faith
to extend beyond "honesty in fact."' 166 The court explicitly stated that
"[w]here the Uniform Commercial Code requires for good faith more
than 'honesty in fact' it explicitly so states."' 67 It appears as though the
courts are very reluctant to initiate extensions of "good faith" beyond the
explicitly enunciated scope of the language of the statue itself. Therefore,
when the official comments of the RUPA suggest that good faith will remain undefined and the courts should independently arrive at their own
definition of good faith, it appears the courts which follow the Duncombe
holding will continue to manifest a conservative approach to the definition of good faith. Despite fears to the contrary, the courts will most
likely avoid an expansive view of good faith that will do violence to the
existing, well developed body of partnership case law. The definition of
good faith is likely to continue to evolve in a manner akin to its preRUPA treatment.
IX. GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IN THE
PARTNERSHIP CONTEXT AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS
Reid v. Bickel & Brewer' 68 was a partnership case characterized by bitterness and disillusionment on all sides and ultimately culminated in the
expulsion of Reid, a partner in the firm of Bickel & Brewer. Reid alleged
that he was wrongfully expelled from the firm in bad faith. Since the
partnership agreement contained an expulsion without cause provision,
the allegation would survive a motion for summary judgment only if Reid
could demonstrate that a bad faith issue existed.' 69 First, the Reid court
stated that "Texas courts have routinely upheld termination-at-will provisions in employment contracts."'1 70 Next, the court cited Gelder Medical
Group v. Webber' 71 where the New York Court of Appeals explained
that a partnership agreement with a termination-at-will provision is regarded as:
common and acceptable ...[w]hile there is no common-law or statutory right to expel a member of a partnership, partners may provide,
in their agreement, for the involuntary dismissal, with or without
cause, of one of their number.., on the majority vote of the partners, the Court may not frustrate the intention of the parties at least
165. 236 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975).
166. Id. at 678.
167. Id.
168. No. 89 Civ. 5777, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11589 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1990).
169. Id. at *9-*11.
170. Id. at *11 (citing Cox v. Bell Helicopter Int'l, 425 F. Supp. 99, 104 (N.D. Tex. 1977);
NHA, Inc. v. Jones, 500 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973, writ ref'd
n.r.e.)); see also Whitehead v. Telesphere Int'l, Inc., 611 F. Supp. 961, 965 (N.D. III. 1985)

(following Texas law in an employment contract action).
171. 363 N.E.2d 573 (N.Y. 1977).
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unso long as the provisions for dismissal work no undue penalty or 172
just forfeiture, overreaching, or other violation of public policy.
The language of Gelder suggests that the New York Court of Appeals
recognized bad faith going to the essence of the contract might have limited the otherwise absolute language of the expulsion provision.' 73 Further, it was recognized that "[a]s with any contractual agreement, in the
time-honored language of the law, there is an implied term of good
faith.' 74 The court in Reid went on to speculate that "[b]ecause a partnership creates a fiduciary relationship among the partners, there may
good faith covenant in a partnership agreement under
exist an implied
1 75
Texas law."
Ultimately the court held that regardless of whether Texas would recognize an implied good faith covenant in the partnership agreement, Reid
failed to present a genuine issue of material fact over whether Bickel &
Brewer acted in bad faith. There was no evidence that the defendants
expelled Reid for personal benefit, or that they did not comply with the
express terms of the agreement that Reid voluntarily and willingly
signed. 176 In addition, the court recognized that under both California
and New York law the doctrine of implied good faith "may not obliterate
rights, such as an at-will termination, expressly embodied in a written
contract."'1 77 In essence, the language of the court in Reid seems to fit
neatly within the definition of good faith in a partnership context as defined by the official comments to the RUPA in section 404. In Reid the
court recognized the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing as an implied
obligation in every partnership agreement, but narrowed the purview of
the obligation in a way that rendered good faith relevant to only the most
egregious of circumstances.
In Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray178 the Indiana Court of Appeals recognized that the Indiana Uniform Partnership Act mandates that expulsion
of a partner must be in good faith.' 79 If the partner is expelled for "predatory purposes" or in bad faith, the partnership agreement itself is violated.' 80 Lawlis, the plaintiff, was a partner in a law firm and was
addicted to alcohol. From the time that Lawlis's partners knew of his
condition they tried to help him through the medical crisis, despite the
fact that Lawlis was absent from work for a considerable amount of time
172. Id. at 576.
173. Id. at 577.
174. Id.
175. Reid v. Bickel & Brewer, No. 89 Civ. 5777, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11589, at *12*13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1990) (citation omitted).
176. Id at *14.
177. Id. at *15 (citing Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44-45 (Cal. 1961)); see also Caton v.
Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 946 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that an implied duty of good faith
can not override an at-will termination clause); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l, 642 F.2d 929, 957
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 965 (1981) (following New York in upholding a termination at will clause).
178. 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
179. Id. at 440 (citing IND. CODE § 23-4-1-31(1)(d) (1977)).
180. I
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due to the time he spent in sanotariums. Lawlis tried to conceal his condition from the other partners in his firm for many months. For a number
of years, the law firm allowed Lawlis to continue drawing money from the
partnership account even though Lawlis's productivity continually declined. Lawlis received a number of warnings yet resumed the consumption of alcohol. Finally, a recommendation was made to allow Lawlis to
remain a partner for another eight months while drawing up to $25,000
while looking for a new job. Under the facts of the case, the court found
that the partners lacked a predatory purpose and held that the partners
acted in good faith as a matter of law.181 The court went on to provide a
definition of good faith in the partnership context:
[w]here the remaining partners in a firm deem it necessary to expel a
partner under a no cause expulsion clause in a partnership agreement freely negotiated and entered into, the expelling partners act in
"good faith" regardless of motivation if that act does not cause a
wrongful withholding of money or property legally due the expelled
partner at the time he is expelled. Used in this context, "good faith"
means... a state of mind indicating honesty and lawfulness of purpose: belief in one's legal title or right: belief that one's conduct is
... : absence of fraud, deceit, collusion, or gross
not unconscionable
182
negligence.
In expelling Lawlis, the remaining partners were acting within their rights
under a terminable-at-will agreement. The partners dealt with Lawlis
compassionately even though they were not obligated to do so by the
terms of the partnership agreement or by the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing.
In Holman v. Coie183 Holman complained of his expulsion by his former partners from a law firm where his father was the senior partner and
where Holman had been a partner since 1954. The expulsion of Holman
was effected pursuant to an expulsion clause in the partnership agreement. 18 Holman argued that the expulsion provision could not possibly
be binding unless there existed certain implied provisions of due process. 185 The court held that:
the express language of the partnership agreement itself must be
controlling; that language clearly does not contain any of the requirements plaintiffs now seek to assert as impliedly applicable.
Where terms of a contract, taken as a whole, are plain and unambig186
uous, the meaning is to be deduced from the contract alone.
The court further held that while most cases of involuntary ouster involve
controversy, "[i]t is not the province of the court to alter a contract by
181. Id.at 441.
182. Id. at 442-43 (citations omitted).
183. 522 P.2d 515 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 984 (1975).
184. Id. at 519.
185. Id. at 521.
186. Id. (citing Dickson v. Hausman, 413 P.2d 378 (Wash. 1966); Hastings v. Continental Food Sales, Inc., 376 P.2d 436 (Wash. 1962)).
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construction or to make a new contract for the parties; its duty is confined
'18 7
to the interpretation of the one which they have made for themselves.'
The court went on to recognize that "the general rule of law is that the
1 88
partners in their dealings with each other must exercise good faith."'
The relationship between copartners "requires the exercise of the utmost
good faith."'1 89 Therefore, "no individual or group may take unconscionable advantage of another."' 90 However, the court found that relationships to which "good faith" relates are limited to those involving a
property or a business aspect. Since Holman's claims did not involve a
business or property right of the partnership, there was no breach of good
faith. 191
The court agreed that every partnership agreement contains an implied
covenant of good faith' 92 and that in this context good faith means "[aln
honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of
another, even through technicalities of law, together with an absence of
all information, notice or benefit or belief of facts which would render
transaction unconscientious."'1 93 The sudden expulsion of the partner is
not a sufficient reason to find a breach of the duty of good faith. 194 The
"guillotine" method of expulsion was expressly agreed to in the partnership agreement. The mere utilization of an agreed upon procedure,
19 5
therefore, does not constitute a violation of the provision of good faith.
In Rosenthal v. Rosenthal' 96 the court held that in evaluating whether
conduct amounted to bad faith, the court may not intrude into the decisionmaking process beyond the determination of whether the decision
was improperly motivated. 97 Whether the decision itself was wise or judicious is governed by the business judgment rule. In other words, "honest and unselfish decision(s)" exercised for the interest of the corporation
may not be second guessed by the court, unless the business decision was
motivated by fraud or bad faith. 198
The Supreme Court of Maine decided that the fiduciary duties parties
owe to each other are judged under the business judgment rule at the
time the decision was made. In Rosenthal, members of a family owned
business had a dispute over a policy of profit payments and reinvestment
into the business. Ultimately, Theodore Rosenthal sold his share of the
187. Id. at 523 (quoting McPherson v. J.E. Jirrine & Co., 33 S.E.2d 501, 510 (S.C.
1945)).

188. Holman v. Coie, 522 P.2d 515, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
984 (1975).
189. Id
190. Id. (citing Danich v. Culjack, 66 P.2d 860, 863 (Wash. 1937)). Cf. Karle v. Seder,
214 P.2d 684 (Wash. 1950) with Jacobsen v. Arntzen, 460 P.2d 295 (Wash. Ct. App. 1969).
191. 522 P.2d at 523.
192. Id

193. Id. (citing
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
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Id
Id
543 A.2d 348 (Me. 1988).
Id. at 353.
Id.

822 (4th ed. 1951)).
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business and then later claimed to have been forced out by Rona and
Robert Rosenthal. Theodore alleged that he was compelled to sell his
portion of the business at an unfairly low price. 199

In evaluating the transaction of which Theodore Rosenthal com-

plained, the court recognized that it was not within its domain to inquire
into "the prudence of business decisions honestly reached by those en-

trusted with the authority to determine what course of action best advances the well-being of the enterprise. ' '200 As long as the business was
run in a manner that was "honest and unselfish, '201 the court will not
question the results "although the results show that what they did was
unwise or inexpedient.

'202

However, if the business decision was moti-

vated by fraud or bad faith, it will not receive the protection of the business judgment rule. 203 "The courts do not intrude upon the process of
business decision making beyond assuring that those decisions are not
improperly motivated. '20 4 Therefore, unless Theodore can demonstrate

that Robert and Rona Rosenthal's conduct was primarily motivated by
fraud or bad faith, the business judgment rule will insulate the defendants
from a finding of liability for violation of their fiduciary duties. 20 5

199. Id at 350.
200. Id. at 353; see Gay v. Gay's Super Markets, Inc., 343 A.2d 577, 580 (Me. 1975)
(quoting Bates Street Shirt Co. v. Waite, 156 A. 293, 298 (Me. 1931)); see also Radol v.
Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 257 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986) (holding that
many corporate decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty); Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984) (following New York case law and the
business judgment rule); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (following
the business judgment rule).
201. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 353.
202. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 353 (Me. 1988) (quoting Pollitz v. Wabash

R.R., 100 N.E. 721, 724 (N.Y. 1912)).
203. Id.; see Gay's Super Markets, 343 A.2d at 580; Radol, 772 F.2d at 257; Norlin, 744
F.2d at 265; Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Co. Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980);
Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1000; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (pt. iv) at 4-5 (Tent. Draft No. 4 1985) (supporting the use of
judicial restraint in evaluating business decisions).
204. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 353.
In a business transaction both sides presumably try to get the best of the
deal. That is the essence of bargaining and the free market. And in the
context of this case, no legal rule bounds the run of business interest. So one

cannot characterize self-interest as bad faith. No particular demand in negotiations could be termed dishonest, even if it seemed outrageous to the other
party. The proper recourse is to walk away from the bargaining table, not to
sue for "bad faith" in negotiations.
AJS Apothekernes Laboratorium for Specialpraeparater v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, Inc., 873
F.2d 155, 159 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Feldman v. Alleghany Int'l, Inc., 850 F.2d 1217, 1223
(7th Cir. 1988). See Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shady Grove Plaza Ltd. Partnership, 734

F. Supp. 1181, 1190 (D. Md. 1990).
205. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 353-54. See Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings and
Loan, 749 F.2d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Gay's Super Markets, 343 A.2d at 581; see also
Radol, 772 F.2d at 257-58; PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 203, at
11.
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In Wyler v. Fever20 6 the appellate court held as long as a partner is
exercising discretion in the reasonable use of "honest business judgment, '20 7 the partner will not be held liable for mistakes or losses incurred as the result of her "good faith exercise of reasonable business
judgment. '20 8 In Wyler the plaintiff asserted that the general partner
breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiff when the movie in which plaintiff invested was a "flop." While there are never any guarantees that an
investment will ultimately be profitable, 209 as long as the defendant made
business decisions in good faith, and with the care of an ordinarily prudent person, the defendant will not be liable for the lack of success of the
movie.2 10 Further, the court assessed the reasonableness of the decision
from the perspective of the time when the business decision was originot be scrutinized by the courts with the
nally made and "said it would
'2 1
cold clarity of hindsight." '
In Froemming v. Gate City FederalSavings & Loan Ass'n 212 the court
held that good faith is essentially a question of fact to be determined by
the factfinder. 2 13 In that assessment, the finder of fact must evaluate "the
credibility of the witnesses, gauge nuances of voice and expression, and
sift through competing and conflicting versions of what occurred and
what state of mind each actor brought to the occurrence. These are all
emphatically matters for the jury. ' 21 4 In the partnership context, good
faith depends on the "knowledge, understanding, and intent of the partner who is charged with breach of fiduciary duty, as2 15well as the understanding, knowledge, and intent of his co-partners.
Good faith also applies to partnership dissolutions. 216 To some commentators, the obligation of good faith in the decision to dissolve a partnership, adds an unnecessary complication to the process. 21 7 The
additional uncertainty created by the obligation of good faith can be seen
Page,218 Leff v. Gunter,21 9 and Roin a series of California cases: Page v.
220
senfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen.
206. 149 Cal. Rptr. 626 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
207. Id. at 633.

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Wyler, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 633.
212. 822 F.2d at 723.
213. Id. at 731; see also First Texas Savings, 752 F. Supp. at 1572 (finding good faith is a
factual matter to be determined by the totality of the circumstances existing during the
contractual relationship of the parties and further because of the factual nature of good
faith, it is not a matter which can be decided summarily).
214. Froemming, 822 F.2d at 731.
215. Id.
216. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms And Their Partners: The Law And
Ethics Of Grabbing And Leaving, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing partnership

dissolutions).
217. Id.
218. 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961).
219. 658 P.2d 740 (Cal. 1983).
220. 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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In Page221 the California Supreme Court first announced the good faith
doctrine. In this case, a partner in a linen supply company sought to oust
another partner because he realized that the success of the partnership
did not depend on the continued participation of this particular partner.
The Supreme Court of California held that even though the partnership
was terminable-at-will, partnership law prohibits the dissolution of terminable-at-will partnerships in bad faith. 222 Then, in Lef, 2 2 3 the Supreme
Court of California affirmed the principle of good faith introduced in
Page, though it did not find an actionable wrong. This holding heightened the perception of good faith as a regulator of partnership
22 4
dissolutions.
In Rosenfeld225 partners of a law firm left the partnership to form their
own law firm. The California Second District Court of Appeals held that
partners do not have the right to dissolve terminable-at-will partnerships
in bad faith. 226 Further, the court held that even nonfiduciaries have the
obligation to exercise their rights in good faith, avoiding injury to the
other partners and generally, dealing fairly with each other. 227 Three implications can be drawn from this series of California holdings: 1) existing
partnership clients constitute the income expectancy for the partnership;
2) it is not permissible to pursue private advantage at the expense of the
other partners by threats to withdraw in order to gain concessions from
other partners such as a larger division of the partnership income; and, 3)
actual withdrawal that results in the transfer of clients from the former
firm to the firm of the partner who is withdrawing is not in good faith and
228
may be challenged.
Rosenfeld, together with Page and Leff, seem to indicate that the good
faith doctrine would preclude partners from withdrawing from a law firm
and taking clients with them to the new firm.229 This application of the
good faith doctrine could increase the amount of litigation in connection
with partnership dissolution because it creates an area of intense ambiguity that can only be resolved through litigation.
X. CONCLUSION
The RUPA's adoption of a contractarian approach to partnership law
coupled with a non-waivable obligation of good faith and fair dealing has
created the potential for intense ambiguity in an area where the law had
been fairly clear. The new provisions of the RUPA can ultimately upset a
221. 359 P.2d at 41.
222. Id. at 42-44.
223. 658 P.2d at 740.
224. Hillman, supra note 216, at 45.
225. 194 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
226. Id
227. Id.
228. Hillman, supra note 216, at 43-50.
229. Id.
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relatively settled area of the law and force the courts to reconsider the
manner in which partnership law works.
Significantly, the drafters of the RUPA stated in the comments that
they intentionally did not supply a definition of the mandatory obligation
of good faith and fair dealing, leaving the definition of that provision to
the courts. The official comments suggest the UCC as a starting place for
the definition but suggest that the UCC's definition of good faith and fair
dealing is too narrow for the purpose of partnership law. The comments
fail, however, to provide any other guidance on this issue.
It is also quite possible that the courts will decline the invitation to
make significant departures from the existing body of law essentially ignoring the new changes; or, more euphemistically, to interpret the new
provisions in a manner that comports with the existing body of partnership law. It is also true that there is a general trend in modern case law
reflecting the same step away from the strict fiduciary relationship calling
for the "punctilio of an honor" 2 30 and towards a more pragmatic and
Darwinian outlook on the relationship between partners. Increasingly,
the courts have declined the parentalistic role of reinterpreting negotiated terms of contracts, unless the agreements were entered into in bad
faith. In the absence of fraud or bad faith, the courts will enforce the
terms of the partnership agreement as they were written, even when the
partnership agreement permits the pursuit of self-interest.
It is still too early to predict the outcome of the changes with certainty.
Currently, in the face of the ever-increasing controversy over the changes
to the Partnership Act, it is likely that more changes will soon be
forthcoming.

230. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). This opinion represents the most
famous of the classical view of partnership relationships.

